



Conclusion: "The (Color-Blind) Emperor Has No Clothes"

Exposing the Whiteness of Color Blindness

If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, or it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.

—Frederick Douglass, *My Bondage and My Freedom*

"I thought racism died in the sixties? But you guys keep talking, and talking, and talking about racism. Please stop using racism as a crutch!"

"Don't you think the best way of dealing with America's racial problems is by not talking about them? By constantly talking about racism you guys add wood to the racial fire, which is almost extinguished!"

"Race is a myth, an invention, a socially constructed category. Therefore, we should not make it 'real' by using it in our analyses. People are people, not black, white, or Indian. White males are just people."¹

"A&M's tradition of focusing on race is a terrible mentality to teach a new generation. Dr. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's book *White Supremacy & Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era* is the latest evolution in this ritual that should have collapsed with the 1960s."²

Statements such as these have become standard examples of how most

whites think and talk about racism in contemporary America. Those of us who are minority professors in the academic trenches hear statements like these from students, staff, and colleagues. I personally have been accused of being a "racist" because I use the category race in my analysis (as if by closing our eyes, racial fractures would disappear from society and we would all just be "Americans") and of spreading "racist propaganda"³ (in the color-blind era, those of us who write about race and racism are the ones accused of fostering racial divisions). These statements are all emblematic of the racial ideology that in this book I labeled "color-blind racism." At the heart of these statements—and of color blindness—lies a myth: the idea that race has all but disappeared as a factor shaping the life chances of all Americans. This myth is the central column supporting the house of color blindness. Remove this column and the house will collapse.

Removing this column, however, is not an easy task, because whites' racial views are not mere erroneous ideas to be battled in the field of rational discourse. They constitute, as I argued in this book, a racial ideology, a loosely organized set of ideas, phrases, and stories that help whites justify contemporary white supremacy;⁴ they are the *collective representations*⁵ whites have developed to explain, and ultimately justify, contemporary racial inequality. Their views, then, are not just a "sense of group position"⁶ but *symbolic expressions of whites' dominance*. As such, they cannot be simply eradicated with "facts," because racial facts are highly contested. In the eyes of most whites, for instance, evidence of racial disparity in income, wealth, education, and other relevant matters becomes evidence that there is something wrong with minorities themselves; evidence of minorities' overrepresentation in the criminal justice system or on death row is interpreted as evidence of their overrepresentation in criminal activity; evidence of black and Latino underperformance in standardized tests is a confirmation that there is something wrong (maybe even genetically wrong)⁷ with them.

Given that this ideology—like all ideologies—cannot be simply impugned with facts,⁸ my main goal in this book was to decode the components of color blindness and explain their functions. In chapters 2, 3, and 4, I demonstrated how color-blind racism's frames, style, and racial stories help whites justify contemporary racial inequality. Whites use these components like "building blocks"⁹ to manufacture accounts on a variety of racial matters. In general, their accounts amount to, "Race does not matter that much today, so let's move on." For example, when whites are asked about affirmative action, they resort to the frame of abstract liberalism to oppose it: "Why should we use discrimination to combat discrimination? Two wrongs don't make a right. We should judge people by their merits and let the best person get the job or promotion, or be admit-

ted into a good college." When whites are confronted with the reality of the tremendous levels of residential and school segregation in the United States, they argue race has nothing to do with these matters. Many resort to the naturalization frame and say, "This is a natural thing. People prefer to be with people who are like them." Alternatively, they use the abstract liberalism frame and proclaim, "People have the right of choosing to live wherever they want to live. This is America, for God's sake!" When whites are faced with evidence of discrimination, they acknowledge its occurrence but label the episodes as "isolated incidents" and proceed to blame minorities for playing the "race card." Finally, when whites are questioned about the whiteness of their social networks, they rebut, "This has nothing to do with race. It's just the way things are." And if this does not work, they can project the problem onto minorities and say, "It's blacks who do not want to be with us. I have seen how they self-segregate in their neighborhoods and even when they attend our colleges." Others may be embarrassed by the makeup of their social networks and feel compelled to insert semantic moves ("Well, that's true, but some of my best friends are black") or personal stories ("My best buddy in Vietnam was Samoan!") to save face.

These frames, as I argued, set whites onto paths of no return. By regarding race-related matters as nonracial, "natural," or rooted in "people's choices," whites deem almost all proposals to remedy racial inequality necessarily as illogical, undemocratic, and "racist" (in reverse).

Besides examining the components of color-blind racism, I discussed two other important features in the color-blind era. First, I explored in chapter 5 the contradiction between whites claiming to be color blind and their almost totally white pattern of social interaction. Second, I examined in chapter 7 the influence of color-blind racism on blacks. In chapter 5 I showed that whites, despite their professed color blindness, live in white neighborhoods, associate primarily with whites, befriend mostly whites, and choose whites as their mates. The contradiction between their professed life philosophy and their real practice in life is not perceived by whites as such because they do not interpret their hypersegregation and isolation from minorities (in particular blacks) as a *racial* outcome. For most whites, this is just "The way things are" or something that has nothing to do with race. In chapter 7 I concurred with most researchers¹⁰ in showing that blacks exhibit a different attitudinal outlook on racial issues than whites. Blacks, unlike whites, believe discrimination is real and central in shaping their life chances and that the government must intervene in a number of areas to guarantee equality among the races (therefore, blacks are significantly more likely to support affirmative action, busing, and even reparations than whites). Blacks are also more likely than whites to engage in interracial friendship and intimacy. Nevertheless, I also doc-

umented how blacks are influenced by many of the frames of color blindness, directly and indirectly. Specifically, I underscored the large indirect effect of the frames of color blindness on blacks and how this blunts the oppositional character of their perspectives on racial matters. For example, many blacks endorse stereotypical views about themselves (e.g., blacks are lazy, less intelligent, or more athletic than whites), which leads them to adopt confusing standpoints (e.g., "Discrimination is very important, but we are a lazy people").

Finally, I examined "race traitors"—whites who do not dance to the tune of color blindness (see chapter 6). Unlike most social scientists, who posit that educated (mostly middle-class) white folks are racially tolerant and, hence, more likely to support the struggle for racial equality, my research suggested working-class women are significantly more likely than any other segment of the white population to be racially progressive. I also pointed out a number of other factors that racial progressives have in common that may explain their racial progressiveness, such as growing up in racially mixed neighborhoods, having extensive equal-status contacts with minorities, being center-to-left politically, and having dated across the color line. Although more research needs to be conducted to corroborate my findings, specify the set of circumstances (what sociologists call "variables") and the conditions that lead actors to become racially progressive, and determine why this segment of the white population is more progressive than others, I tentatively suggest that because working-class women experience at least two kinds of oppression (as workers and as women), they are more likely to empathize with racial minorities. In their narratives, many of these women used their own experiences as women to articulate their views on various hotly contested racial issues and, more specifically, to describe how discrimination occurs nowadays. Nevertheless, as in the case of blacks, I also showed that the "souls of [these] white folks"¹¹ are not pure, that is, that their racial progressiveness has some limits, as they too are influenced by color blindness.

The interview data in this book demonstrated that color-blind racism is central to old and young whites alike. Although older, working-class white respondents (mostly in the DAS sample) were less adept at using softer, more efficient versions of the frames and style of color-blind racism than were younger, middle-class, educated ones (mostly among the college students sample), both groups were attuned to this new ideology. Yet the fact that some whites are "compassionate conservatives" on race does not change in any way the reality that all are baptized in the waters of color-blind racism. Besides, even though younger, middle-class, educated whites seem better adept at using the arsenal of color blindness, many—particularly those who were already in the labor market or close

to entering it—were as crude and unsophisticated as their poorer, less-educated brethren. To examine this matter more accurately, we need a panel study to follow college students over a ten-year period or so to assess whether or not, as they mature and deal with central life issues (e.g., getting a job, purchasing a house, getting married, having children), their color blindness becomes cruder.

The data also evinced color-blind racism forms an impregnable yet elastic ideological wall that barricades whites off from America's racial reality. An impregnable wall because it provides them a safe, color-blind way to state racial views without appearing to be irrational or rabidly racist. And an elastic wall—and hence a stronger one—because this ideology does not rely on absolutes (it prefers statements such as "Most blacks are" rather than "All blacks are"), admits a variety of ways of using its frames (from crude and direct to kinder and indirect), and allows whites to employ a variety of emotional tones for stating their views (from the angry "Darned lazy blacks" to the compassionate conservative "Poor blacks are trapped in their inferior schools in their cycle of poverty; what a pity").

Accordingly, my answer to the strange enigma of "racism without racists" is as follows. The United States does not depend on Archie Bunkers to defend white supremacy. (In truth, it never did, but that is *otros veinte pesos*.)¹² Modern racial ideology does not thrive on the ugliness of the past or on the language and tropes typical of slavery and Jim Crow. Today there is a sanitized, color-blind way of calling minorities niggers, Spics, or Chinks. Today most whites justify keeping minorities from having the good things of life with the language of liberalism ("I am all for equal opportunity; that's why I oppose affirmative action!"). And today, as yesterday, whites do not feel guilty about the plight of minorities (blacks in particular). Whites believe minorities have the opportunities to succeed and that, if they do not, it is because they do not try hard. And if minorities dare talk about discrimination, they are rebuked with statements such as "Discrimination ended in the sixties, man" or "You guys are hypersensitive."

The analysis of the interview data also sheds light on the methodological importance of using this kind of data for examining racial ideology. Had I relied on my survey results to analyze whites' racial views, it would have been difficult. Depending on which questions I had used to make my case, I seemingly could have argued three totally different positions.¹³ Moreover, I could not have extracted from the survey data the stylistic and narrative elements of color blindness. Although this does not mean that surveys on racial attitudes are useless, it does mean that survey researchers must strive to develop research projects with a qualitative dimension. Otherwise they may either produce an artificial image of

racial progress (see chapter 1) or miss central components of the contemporary racial ideological constellation.

One set of questions that I could not answer properly with the data at hand related to how color-blind racism affects other racial minorities and how whites see other racial minorities in our new, more complex multiracial America. *Preliminarily*, although conceding that we lack data sets that include all racial groups, involve questions on interethnic matters, and include in-depth interviews with all the racial and ethnic groups, I answer these questions as follows. First, the black-white continuum still provides the bulk of the themes and imagery for the development of the primary ideas associated with the dominant racial ideology.¹⁴ Consequently, even when one asks generic questions about minorities, whites are likely to focus on the black-white debate. Second, the practices of the "new racism"—the post-Civil Rights set of arrangements that preserves white supremacy in a mostly "kinder and gentler" way—affect *all* minorities, but the "race effect" seems to vary by the degree of closeness to "whiteness" of the groups in question (phenotypically, culturally, and so forth). For instance, although Latinos experience housing discrimination, they are less likely to experience it if they are perceived as "white" than if they are perceived as "black."¹⁵ Similarly, although whites tend to marry endogamously, when they cross the color line, they are more likely to do so with Latinos (particularly with those of a lighter hue) and Asians than with blacks. Lastly, the racial attitudes of racial minorities seem to fit their "ranking" in the new racial hierarchy in America: Asians have views that are closer to those of whites, Latinos' views are less like those of whites, and blacks' are furthest from whites' views.¹⁶ Therefore, because of the aforementioned trends, I believe whites are already making important distinctions among the various racial minorities; that such distinctions have objective, subjective, and social interactional consequences for minorities themselves; and that the degree of "color blindness" among minorities correlates with their position in this new, more complex racial stratification order.¹⁷ Yet, on all these crucial issues for the future of race relations in America, I claim, like most social scientists do, that more research needs to be done before we can adequately answer these questions.

Since I do not want to conclude this book on a pessimistic note, let me suggest a few of the political conditions necessary to fight color-blind racism. (Please see chapter 8 for a discussion of the politics and political strategies needed if the United States develops a Latin America-like racial stratification order.) First, blacks and their allies would be the core¹⁸ of a new civil rights movement demanding equality of results.¹⁹ I documented in chapter 7 that blacks, as a social collectivity, have a clear understanding of the basics of post-Civil Rights white supremacy and, therefore, their

views and experiences ought to help guide this new movement. However, because color blindness has tainted their views, it is of cardinal importance that activists in the new movement educate the black masses on the nuances of color blindness. To launch a frontal attack on the "new racism" and its color-blind ideology, the black masses must be as racially conscious as the leaders of the new movement. In ideological terms, the movement must break with the hegemony color blindness has over all Americans.

Second, we need to nurture a large cohort of antiracist whites to begin challenging color-blind nonsense from within. Whites' collective denial about the true nature of race relations may help them feel good, but it is also one of the greatest obstacles to doing the right thing. In racial matters as in therapy, the admission of denial is the preamble for the beginning of recovery. Antiracist whites cannot just be "race traitors";²⁰ they must engage in struggles to end the practices and the ideology that maintain white supremacy. Individual racial treason without a political praxis to eliminate the system that produces racial inequality amounts to racial showboating.

These antiracist white activists,²¹ as I suggested above, will most likely be working-class women. However, as in all social movements, the struggle needs to work to expand the coalition fighting the powers that be. This means that progressive activists need to work with all *vulnerable whites*: poor and working-class whites regardless of gender, whites in the lower middle class, and educated whites who in the past were so central to the struggle for civil rights in America. In order to persuade vulnerable whites to join the struggle, it is important to do ideological work with them (but see below). Hence, the third way of combating color blindness is for researchers and activists alike to provide counter-ideological arguments to *each* of the frames of color-blind racism. We need to counter whites' *abstract* liberalism with *concrete* liberal positions based on a realistic understanding of racial matters and a concern with achieving racial equality. For example, whites' thesis of "We are for equal opportunity for everyone and that's why we oppose affirmative action" must be countered with the concrete argument that because discrimination (past and present) affects minorities negatively, race-based programs and massive programs on behalf of the poor are the only ways of guaranteeing racial equality.²² The racially illiberal effects of the do-nothing social policy advocated by whites must be exposed and challenged.

Fourth, we need to undress whites' claims of color blindness before a huge mirror. That mirror must reflect the myriad facts of contemporary whiteness, such as whites living in white neighborhoods, sending their kids to white schools, associating primarily with whites, and having almost all their primary relationships with whites. And whites' absurd

claim that these facts of whiteness are just a "natural thing" must be deflated with research and exposed by journalists showing the social and personal processes that produce each of these aspects of contemporary white supremacy. Researchers also need to turn the analytical lenses on *white* segregation and isolation from minorities and begin documenting how this isolation affects whites' views, emotions, and cognitions about themselves and about minorities.

Fifth, whiteness must be challenged wherever it exists; regardless of the social organization in which whiteness manifests itself (universities, corporations, schools, neighborhoods, churches), those committed to racial equality must develop a personal practice to challenge it. If you are a college student in a historically white college, you must raise hell to change your college; you must organize to change the racial climate and demography of your college. If you work in corporate America, you must wage war against subtle and covert racism; you must challenge the practices that track minorities into certain jobs and preserve high-paying ones for white males. If you are a parent who spends most of your time housebound, you need to begin a campaign for racial change in your family interactions and attitudes; you must engage with racial minorities, opt for a multiracial rather than a white church, and move from your white neighborhood into an integrated one.

Finally, the most important strategy for fighting "new racism" practices and the ideology of color blindness is to become militant once again. Changes in systems of domination and their accompanying ideologies are never accomplished by racial dialogues—the notion of "Can we all just get along?" or "workshops on racism"—through education, or through "moral reform"²³ alone. What is needed to slay modern-day racism is a new, in-your-face, fight-the-power civil rights movement, a new movement to spark change, to challenge not just color-blind whites but also minority folks who have become content with the crumbs they receive from past struggles. This new civil rights movement, as I have mentioned elsewhere,²⁴ must have at the core of its agenda the struggle for equality of results. Progressives cannot continue fighting for "equality of opportunity" when true equality cannot be achieved that way. It is time to demand equality now!

I realize many of these proposals are very idealistic. I know quite well most whites are not up to the challenge of working to develop a country without white supremacy. For example, few whites would engage in a social movement or in personal practices that would rock the foundation of the status quo and their everyday lives. The idea of moving from a "safe" neighborhood into a "dangerous" one, for instance, is anathema to most white Americans ("Honey, do you want our kids to attend *bad* schools? Do you want us to *lose our investment in this house?*"). However,

social movements do not depend on mobilizing the masses to get started (yet, as I suggested above, successful movements must make *broad appeals* and, at least, gain the sympathy of the majority to be victorious).²⁵ The history of social mobilization shows that organized, active, resourceful, and creative movements have been able to challenge all kinds of oppressive structures.²⁶

If this new civil rights movement begins a concerted campaign to fight "new racism" practices and color-blind idiocy, this movement has a chance. If the leaders of this movement begin to say to America, "We will no longer accept poverty and urban decay, substandard schools and housing, inferior jobs, old- as well as new-fashioned discrimination, and racial profiling, in short, we will no longer accept second-class citizenship in this country," then this movement has a chance. If liberal, progressive, and radical organizations join in this new civil rights movement to eliminate racial disparity in the United States once and for all, this movement has a chance. If progressive religious leaders of various denominations begin to preach about the need to complete the civil rights revolution we started years ago and derail the forces that want to turn back the racial clock, this movement has a chance. If the millions of conscientious college students across the nation wake up and do the right thing, as they did during the Civil Rights era, this movement has a chance. If young people and workers in the United States realize that racial inequality ultimately helps preserve other forms of inequality,²⁷ this movement has a chance. Activists and researchers alike need to realize the basic truth in Frederick Douglass's words, "If there is no struggle, there is no progress. . . . Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will." Change is made, not theorized, written about, or orchestrated by policy makers or researchers. Only by demanding what seems impossible today (equality of results, reparations, and the end of all forms of racial discrimination), will we be able to achieve genuine racial equality in the future.

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IMPORTANT ADDENDUM TO ORIGINAL CONCLUSION

The title of the original conclusion was "The (Color-Blind) Emperor Has No Clothes." Developments since the time I worked on that conclusion (1999–2000) suggest that a more fitting title for the chapter today would be "The (Color-Blind) Emperor Has *New* Clothes." The new "pants" of the emperor are from Latin America, by which I mean that racial stratification in the nation is becoming Latin America-like (the subject of chapter 8). The historical bi-racial order²⁸ (white-nonwhite) is morphing rather

quickly into a more complex racial system. I suggest three new "racial spaces"²⁹ are developing (white, honorary white, and the collective black) and that this order will allow people to make different choices not just about their "identity" but also about their race.³⁰ Given these new spaces, the likelihood of collective action from the traditional or historical "minority race groups" (blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans) is decreasing as the new order fosters individual practices of racial mobility. For example, people who would have been regarded as "black" twenty or thirty years ago can now successfully manufacture a different place for themselves in America. Actors and performers such as "The Rock," Vin Diesel, Keanu Reeves, Jennifer Rubin, and Jennifer Tilly, all "racially mixed" (again, only in this moment this claim is possible as during the Jim Crow period all of them would be assigned the "lower" race in the mix), work all sides of the racial spectrum as they can use their phenotypical capital (dare I say "honorary whiteness") to their advantage.³¹

This newly emerging racial landscape has received a boost from the new "shirt" the emperor began wearing since November 4, 2008: the Obama phenomenon. The election of *this* black man as president (and I will continue insisting on Obama's political and personal peculiarities) has accelerated the pace of the Latin-Americanization process and solidified further the house of color blindness. Why? Because Obama has worked the post-racial game and, as I argued in chapter 9, played perfectly the role whites have constructed for people of color (they "love" minority folks if they "behave," are nice to them, smile a lot, are "cool" and "respectable," and do not talk much about race). This game, which I argued is the true secret behind Obama's success, has placed a black person in power without that altering much the distribution of racial power or how social goods are distributed in the polity. Obama has helped establish what I called in the chapter a "multiracial white supremacy order"—a regime similar to those in the Americas or the Caribbean where people of color are in power without altering the "[racial] order of things" (Foucault 1973).

These two developments (the Latin-Americanization of the racial order and the Obama phenomenon) will make the struggle for racial justice much harder in years to come. In *Obamerica* (see endnote 2 in chapter 9) several factors will buffer racial conflict and limit the likelihood of race-based frontal challenges. First, the traditional racial groups are becoming less "stable" or unified as many members can now make legitimate claims to be something else. For example, immediately after Obama was elected president, many members of the "black elite" joined white America in their nonsensical preaching to poor blacks ("Folks, now you have a black president so you have no more excuses") (see endnote 7 in

chapter 9). This segment which has always tried to distance itself from the "black majority" has now much more space to be something other than black. They can, as many formerly black and Indian people were able to do historically in the Americas and the Caribbean, struggle to create other classifications such as multiracial, bi-racial, or simply American. Thusly the strength of the "black" or "Latino" challenges will be diluted by this development.

Second, the segment or space I label "honorary white" will do a lot of the dirty work of policing racial boundaries and disciplining those in the "collective black." I expect to hear a lot of noise in the next decade about intra-racial or intra-ethnic struggle in the black, Latino, and Asian camps. That fight, however, will denote the efforts of segments within these communities to distance themselves from their groups of origin. And what may be read as intra-racial in the next years may soon become something else (for example, this "racial" discussion may become a "class" discussion among Americans about the behavior of the "poor"—likely to be the very dark segment of the population—and middle and upper-middle class honorary whites). The important thing to point out is that the dominant race in this society (whites) will no longer work alone in preserving the racial order as honorary whites and some individuals³² in the collective black space will help them maintain the coordinates of the new order.

Lastly, as of November 4, 2008, white America has shouted to the world: "(Finally) We are ALL Americans." They have now attained the upper hand in symbolic racial politics as they can tell people of color "We have a black president, what else do *you people* want?" Although some commentators are pointing out the limits of the notion of America as a "post-racial" nation, it is also true that the space for talking and debating race matters in the public has decreased tremendously.

But all empires have fractures and all emperors are eventually replaced. In the case of the new racial order, I outlined in chapters 8 and 9 the weaknesses of the system and suggested things we may do in the struggle for racial justice. I highlighted the urgent need for new social movements to challenge the "matrix of domination"³³ in contemporary America. I also called for doing active political work among the new emerging racial majority in the nation (the collective black) as that work might produce a new historical bloc to fight the current racial order. However, I also expressed my pesoptimism about these possibilities. On the Latin Americanization front, I mentioned that once this type of regime took hold in the Americas and the Caribbean, they became entrenched and posed formidable challenges to those at the bottom of the racial well. In the case of my call for social movements, I pointed out that at least in terms of the Obama moment we are living, political participation has been limited to electoral politics which limits the likelihood of these movements ever

developing. (I know there are many small movements dotting the political territory. My concern, however, is about how the massive participation of Americans—particularly the youth that threw itself into Obama—in mainstream politics has had the nefarious effect of *demobilizing* people and making them into political actors that do “politics” every four years.)

Notwithstanding my pesoptimism, history is what it is and no racial order can maintain itself forever. The oppressed (racially or otherwise) always resist domination and what seems like an insurmountable Mount Everest is always conquered (although some may die trying to reach its top). Accordingly, I end this third and hopefully *last* edition of this book mindful that slavery looked like a system that would never end and it did; that Jim Crow maintained people of color subjected for more than a hundred years³⁴ and it has all but died; and that the “new racism” with its Latin America-like extension looks like fast setting cement, but it will eventually collapse, too. I just hope I am alive when this happens and that my bones allow me to celebrate the real “end of racism” in the country that will then be properly called America with no “k’s.”

NOTES

1. A colleague said something like this to me almost verbatim a few years ago in response to a presentation I gave about racism in sociology. Later on, the same colleague uttered a statement along the same lines to challenge a graduate student's presentation on whiteness. Denying the *social reality* of race because of its constructed nature (see chapter 1), unfortunately, has become respectable in academia. This position, which has been uttered by conservatives such as David Horowitz, has now been adopted by liberals such as Todd Gitlin and even radicals (or former radicals) such as Paul Gilroy. For the latter, see Paul Gilroy, *Against Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2000).

2. Matthew Maddox, “Institutionalized Racism Continues at A&M: Sociology Professor's Book Will Continue Tradition of Racist Ideology on Campus,” *Battalion*, October 2, 2002.

3. Maddox, “Institutionalized Racist Ideology.”

4. Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

5. This is Emile Durkheim's term. However, I use it here in Moscovici's sense. See Serge Moscovici, “The Coming Era of Social Representations,” in *Cognitive Approaches to Social Behaviour*, edited by J. P. Codol and J. P. Leyens (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 115–50.

6. Social psychologist Herbert Blumer conceived prejudice as a “sense of group position” and connected this “sense” to the hierarchical racial order. See Luigi Esposito and John W. Murphy, “Another Step in the Study of Race Relations,” *Sociological Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2000): 171–87.

7. Although color-blind racism need not use biological arguments to maintain

racial privilege, biological arguments creep back from time to time and have not yet been abandoned by at least a third of whites. For instance, in my own DAS, anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of whites believed biological stereotypes about blacks such as the idea that blacks are naturally more athletic than whites and blacks are sexually well-endowed. For an academic incarnation of this tendency, see Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

8. If ideologies are about “meaning in the service of power,” as Thompson argues, they must be countered with power. Counter-ideological battles alone cannot ultimately erode power crystallized in institutions and practices to maintain white privilege. John B. Thompson, *Studies in Theory and Ideology* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1984).

9. For data on New Zealand, see Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, *Mapping the Language of Racism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

10. See chapter 7 for references on blacks.

11. W. E. B. DuBois named one of his chapters “The Souls of White Folk,” in *Darkwater* (Rahway, N.J.: Quinn and Boden, 1920).

12. “Otros veinte pesos” is a Puerto Rican expression that literally means “another twenty dollars” and is used to suggest that a side argument will take a long time to make and, therefore, that making it will distract from the main one.

13. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tyrone A. Forman, “‘I Am Not a Racist, but . . .’: Mapping White College Students’ Racial Ideology in the USA,” *Discourse and Society* 11, no. 1 (2000): 50–85.

14. On this point, see Joe R. Feagin, *Racist America: Roots, Realities, and Future Reparations* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 3.

15. On housing issues, see Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, “Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970–1980,” *American Sociological Review* 52, no. 6 (1987): 802–25. On interracial relationships, see Zhenchao Qian and Daniel T. Lichter, “Measuring Marital Assimilation: Inter-marriage among Natives and Immigrants,” *Social Science Research* 30, no. 2 (2001): 289–312.

16. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Karen Glover, “‘We Are All Americans’: The Latin Americanization of Race Relations in the USA,” in *Changing Terrain of Race and Ethnicity*, edited by Maria Krysan and Amanda Lewis (New York: Russell Sage, 2004).

17. Bonilla-Silva and Glover, “We Are All Americans.”

18. On black social movements in America, see Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

19. For more on this, see the conclusion to my *White Supremacy*.

20. For this concept and an elaboration of the politics behind it, see the journal *Race Traitor*.

21. For a study of white antiracists in American history, see Herbert Aptheker, *Anti-Racism in U.S. History: The First Two Hundred Years* (New York: Greenwood, 1992).

22. For a book focusing on the former, see David Ingram, *Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). For a

policy suggestion that includes both, see William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears* (New York: Knopf, 1996).

23. Today, almost all religious groups in the United States abhor racism and have even denounced their past mistakes. For example, in 1995 the Southern Baptist Convention apologized to blacks for "condoning and/or perpetuating individual and systematic racism." Almost all religious groups advocate a moral crusade against racism, but few do anything beyond their occasional public statements. For a sensitive and intelligent analysis of religion and race in America, see Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

24. Consult the conclusion of my *White Supremacy* for an argument on how this movement should be organized and a discussion of the need for a large movement agenda that includes class and gender concerns.

25. A good book for the basics of the social movement literature is Stanford M. Lyman, *Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case-Studies* (New York: New York University Press, 1995). For a good book that argues that social movements need to make broad appeals and develop "connective structures" among different sectors, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Social Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

26. For an excellent collection of essays discussing the array of new and creative contemporary movements, see Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). For examples of how to build multiracial coalitions, see John Anner, ed., *Beyond Identity Politics: Emerging Social Justice Movements in Communities of Color* (Boston: Beacon, 1996).

27. This point has been made by, among others, Joe R. Feagin, in *Racist America* (New York: Routledge, 2000); his newer book, Joe R. Feagin, *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression* (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Patricia Hill-Collins, in "Moving beyond Gender: Intersectionality and Scientific Knowledge," in *Revising Gender*, edited by Myra Marx Ferre, Judith Lorber, and Beth B. Hess (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999), 261–84.

28. The American racial order was never truly "bi-racial" if by that one means white-black. Across the nation other groups were part of the racial order and, in some places, were more significant than blacks (e.g., Mexican Americans throughout much of the Southwest and Native Americans in states such as Oklahoma). The point, however, is that in most of the nation the color line was fundamentally structured around the white-non-white divide. However, see the work of Reginald Daniel, *More Than Black? Multiracial Identity and the New Racial Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002) for a discussion on "tri-racial isolates."

29. In the chapter here and in the previous edition I used terms such as "groups" and "strata" to refer to the three new collectivities I surmised were emerging. However, I also pointed out the inchoate and permeability of the boundaries of these groups. Lately (in truth, I used the term in 2004 in an article in the now defunct *Race and Society* journal as well as in talks on this matter), I have referred to these collectivities as "racial spaces" to denote more clearly their "in itself" rather than "for itself." This is also the case of racial formations in Latin

America and the Caribbean, that is, for many reasons, they seldom cohere as groups and act collectively. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "Are the Americas 'Sick with Racism' or Is It a Problem at the Poles? A Reply to Christina A. Sue," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32, no. 6 (2009): 1071–82.

30. Sociologists of race and ethnicity make a distinction between "identity" as a mostly personal or subjective matter that may or may not correlate with your "race." Thus, a person that is regarded by most observers in a polity as "black" may call herself "white," "American," or "bi-racial." "Race" refers to the historical-political categories that are created in a racialized polity and have a strong externality, that is, actors are defined as such by others in the polity and have limited chances of challenging that characterization. In the above mentioned case, for instance, the person self-identifying herself as white or any other identity would be viewed and treated by most as black.

31. For an interesting discussion on this matter as well as on the way that "multiculturalism" is used in cinema, see Mary C. Beltrán, "The New Hollywood Racelessness: Only the Fast, Furious, (and Multiracial) Will Survive," *Cinema Journal* 44, no. 2 (2005) 50–67.

32. I have suggested in chapter 8 and in many of my writings and presentations on this subject that many individuals in the collective black space may help buffer conflict in their efforts to be "anything but (part of the collective) black." It is to their individual advantage to distance themselves from those in their space if they wish to attain racial mobility and, hence, will likely step all over their brethren on their way up.

33. All modern societies exhibit a complex hierarchical order that includes class, gender, and race and other social categories. Thus, although I have focused mostly on the racial aspects of the American social order, I have also alluded to and included in some parts of my analyses the need for movements that are cognizant of the fact of this complexity. For a good discussion on this matter, read *anything* written by philosopher Charles W. Mills.

34. An impressive recent book describing the resistance of blacks to Jim Crow and the centrality of militant struggle is Hasan Kwame Jeffries, *Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt* (New York and London: NYU Press, 2009).